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CHAPTER 4
What FinTech Can Learn  
from High-Frequency Trading:  
Economic Consequences, Open Issues 
and Future of Corporate Disclosure
Eleonora Monaco
Abstract  This chapter provides a review on key literature on High-
Frequency Trading (HFT) over an 11-year period. Using a thematic 
analysis, the main themes developed within this research stream are iden-
tified and insights on the evolution of theory in relation to HFT are 
presented. This analysis highlights that the effects of HFT on market 
liquidity, trading strategies and speed, implications for market structure 
changes, and the relationship between the “scriptability” of corporate 
disclosure and HFT short-term information advantage, are key themes. 
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The analysis also suggests that many open questions remain unanswered 
including more recent HFT trading strategies and complex techniques 
applied to analyse the content of both voluntary and mandatory corpo-
rate disclosure. As capital markets evolve, HFT’s speed may no longer 
be sufficient to maintain competitiveness. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of future trends and areas for research on HFT.
Keywords  High-frequency trading · Literary review · Market quality · 
Regulation · Corporate disclosure scriptability
4.1  IntroductIon
In the last years, investment in financial technology (FinTech) grew by 
201% around the world; total venture capital investments only grew by 
63% in the same period (Aldridge and Krawciw 2017). According to 
Informilo.com, in 2015 payment services, online loans, data analytics and 
automated investing have resulted in the fastest-growing areas for big 
data in finance. Specifically, investment automation and other new related 
technologies have transformed the structure of capital markets. Reducing 
market-wide latency, the introduction of both co-location services and 
fast trading platforms enable new sophisticated investors to enter into the 
market. Therefore, using high speed and high-performance computing, 
sophisticated tools and algorithms, algorithmic traders (AT) rapidly trade 
securities in the main stock exchanges around the world. These changes 
and the behaviour of market participants attract considerable attention 
by both the academic community and policymakers. Many papers discuss 
the role played by AT in capital markets as well as their trading strategies 
and consequences for market quality. Similarly, market regulators have 
expressed concerns about the growing participation of ATs and the costs 
associated with monitoring their activities.
This chapter provides a review of the High-frequency trading (HFT) 
literature based on 11 years of publications, discusses HFT consequences 
on capital markets, and suggests future research directions. Following 
a similar approach adopted by prior studies (Massaro et al. 2016), this 
chapter aims to answer three questions:
• What are the major themes that have been discussed in HFT 
research field?
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• What are the main issues and critique on HFT activity?
• What is the future of HFT research?
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The next section 
considers the differing approaches to defining HFT by both regulators 
and scholars and presents an overview of common datasets used to inves-
tigate HFT activity. This is followed by a summary of the methodology 
used for the literature review and associated data collection. The results 
of the literature review are then presented. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the findings and directions for future research.
4.2  HIgH-Frequency tradIng: deFInItIon and data
In general, total trading activity can be classified into two main cate-
gories: algorithmic trading (AT)  and non-algorithmic trading activity 
(NAT) depending on whether or not market participants use algorithms 
to make trading decisions without human intervention (ESMA 2014). 
The European Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II)  
provides two different definitions of the concepts HFT and AT, where the 
former is a subset of the latter. Specifically, AT is defined as “[…] trad-
ing in financial instruments where a computer algorithm automatically 
determines individual parameters of orders, such as whether to initiate 
of an order or how to manage the order after its submission, with lim-
ited or no human interaction” (MiFID II 2014, p. 384). This does not 
include any system that is only used for the purpose of routing orders 
to one or more trading venues or for the processing of orders involving 
no determination of any trading parameters or for the confirmation of 
orders or the post-trade processing of executed transactions (MiFID II 
2014). Moreover, the MiFID II (2014, pp. 384–385) defines HFT as “an 
algorithmic trading technique that is characterized by an infrastructure 
that minimize network and other type of latencies using specific facilities 
as co-location, proximity hosting or high-speed direct electronic access 
and by a system determination of order initiation, generation and execu-
tion without human intervention for trades or orders”.
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission takes a broader 
approach in defining HFT as “professional traders acting in a proprietary 
capacity that engage in strategies that generate a large number of trades 
on a daily basis” (SEC 2010, p. 45). Similarly, the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission emphasises HFT’s ability to generate large 
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numbers of orders, many of which are cancelled rapidly and to hold posi-
tions for very short time horizons (ASIC 2010).
Although there is no common definition of HFT, several regulatory 
agencies and scholars do attempt to identify two main features and trading 
strategies of HFT, namely: (i) the automation of the trading process, and 
(ii) the high speed of transactions and submission (cancellation) of orders.
Different methods have been applied to classify HFT activities. For 
example, the definition used by SEC (2010) allows the identification 
of HFT activities but fails to detect large blocks of HFT. Some scholars 
instead detect such blocks by focusing on the evidence of high trading vol-
ume and balance inventory (Kirilenko et al. 2017) or on complex trading 
strategies characterised by “series of submissions, cancellations, and execu-
tions that are linked by direction, size and timing, and which are likely to 
arise from a single algorithm” (Hasbrouck and Saar 2013, p. 656).
Given that only a few datasets (such as E-Mini Data and NASDAQ 
data) allow the identification of HFT, most studies are based on proxies to 
detect HFT activity and highlight the effects of HFT on capital markets. 
The current HFT datasets available can be classified into five categories:
• Data for equity trading on NASDAQ;
• Data on trading in the E-Mini;
• Data that CFTC and SEC staff used to prepare their report on the 
market disruption that occurred in 2010 (Flash Crash);
• A variety of datasets made available to researchers by exchanges and 
regulators that require proxies to identify HFT activity.
According to Boehmer et al. (2018) and Hendershott et al. (2011), mes-
sage traffic can include new order submissions, modifications or order 
cancellations. Hence, the main proxies used by researchers are trading 
volume (Clark-Joseph 2013; Baron et al. 2017; Kirilenko et al. 2017), 
raw messages, the ratio of both trading volume and number of messages 
(Hendershott et al. 2011), and the ratio of messages and total transactions.
4.2.1  Methodology
This section explains the methods for selecting and reviewing the arti-
cles examined in this study. Following the methodology used in Massaro 
et al. (2016) and similar approaches used by prior studies, a dataset of 
articles was constructed. The dataset counts HFT articles published in 
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the main accounting and finance journals featured in the Scopus database 
by Elsevier for the 11-year period from 1 January 2007 to 15 May 2018. 
In order to be included in the sample, articles must mention the terms 
“high-frequency trading” or “algorithmic trading” in the title, abstract or 
keywords. Those papers that did not meet the required conditions were 
discarded, reducing the list of articles to 265 articles (either published or 
forthcoming on 15 May 2018). Author details, article title, year of publica-
tion, SCOPUS citations, affiliation of authors and location were collected.
Firstly, the articles were classified based on whether they were published 
in generalist or specialist journals. 87 articles were published in general 
journals, while 178 articles were published in specialist journals. The latter 
category includes journals whose scope focuses specifically on HFT activ-
ity e.g. Algorithmic Finance Journal, on trading issues and structures of 
financial markets e.g. Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Journal of Financial Markets, Journal of Empirical Finance and others.
Secondly, the selected articles were classified by examining their cita-
tions to measure the academic impact of each article and to provide 
insights into the evolution of the literature (Table 8.1). The journals 
were further categorised by ABS Journal Ranking (or not) and the main 
topics covered in each article were identified.
4.2.2  Descriptive Statistics
This section reports some descriptive statistics to provide a clear picture 
of the evolution of the HFT literature. The first article that refers to the 
“activity of algorithmic trading” was published in 2007 (Prix et al. 2007) 
and describes the systematic patterns in the submission and cancellation 
of certain Xetra orders.1 Figure 4.1 shows the evolution of the volume of 
papers published in generalist or in specialist journals ranked by Scopus 
in the chose time period. A sharp increase in the articles is evident from 
2010, following the “Flash Crash” in May of that year, which signalled 
the start of increased academic discussion of the consequences of HFT 
activity on capital markets.
However, the largest number of contributions was published in the 
four years between 2013 and 2017 in which not only specialist jour-
nals but also generalist journals published articles (123 and 58 articles, 
1 The advantage of “the predatory traders” over uninformed traders has been discussed 
for the first time by Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2005).
56  E. MONACO
respectively) noting the consequences of HFT activity on capital markets 
as well as the impact of new regulation, released by different countries, 
to limit their presence.
An examination of author affiliation allows the identification of the 
institutions in which researchers conducted their studies on HFT. This 
analysis suggests that the leading institutions publishing in the field of 
AT research include The University of Toronto, The University of 
California Berkeley, The University of Oxford, The University of Sydney, 
The University of Washington and Imperial College London. The major-
ity of studies were developed in USA (30%), UK (14%), France (7%) and 
Australia (7%) (Fig. 4.2).


















































































































































































































Fig. 4.2 Absolute frequency of articles by Scholars’ location on the final sample
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Analysis of the research quality of HFT publications suggests that 
since the appearance of the seminal paper of Hendershott et al. (2011), 
21 articles were published in ABS 4* Journals (Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Economics, 
Journal of Financial Economics, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Review 
of Economic Studies, Review of Financial Studies), 5 articles were pub-
lished by ABS 4 journals and another 103 articles by ABS 3 journals 
(Tables 4.1 and 4.2) AT research is not only topical but is considered a 
priority by the major high-quality journals.
4.3  results
4.3.1  Thematic Analysis
A thematic analysis was performed to identify and classify the 
main themes discussed in the literature (Clarke and Braun 2013). 
Furthermore, a citation analysis based on the Scopus index (Dumay 
2014) was used to identify articles and authors that have the most impact 
in HFT research (Garfield 1977). Table 4.3 presents the distribution of 
a subsample of 168 articles that have been classified by topic. Only the 
articles published on the highest rated ABS-ranked journals 4*, 4, 3 and 
2 (with at least 1 citation) have been included in the subsample. The 
table reports both frequency and sum of citations by topic. The latter 
table suggests four main research paths i.e.
1.  effects on market quality and price discovery,
2.  trading strategies,
3.  impact of financial markets structure, regulation and co-location, and
4.  HFT reaction to corporate disclosure.
The most cited articles discuss both about effects of HFT on market qual-
ity (1098 citations related to the 34.5% of articles in the sample) and the 
trading strategies implemented (259 citations related to 36 articles).
4.3.2  Impact of HFT
4.3.2.1 Effects on Market Quality
In the last years, several studies have examined the consequences of 
HFTs on market quality by investigating both various dimensions of 
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Table 4.2 Distribution of articles included in Scopus database and in the top 
ABS ranked journals (4*−4−3)
Journals N % ABS 
ranking
Quantitative Finance 19 7.17 3
Journal of Financial Markets 17 6.42 3
Financial Review 12 4.53 3
Journal of Financial Economics 9 3.40 4*
Journal of Banking and Finance 9 3.40 3
Journal of Futures Markets 7 2.64 3
Journal of Finance 5 1.89 4*
Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money
5 1.89 3
Annual Review of Financial Economics 3 1.13 3
European Journal of Finance 3 1.13 3
International Review of Financial Analysis 3 1.13 3
Journal of Accounting Research 2 0.75 4*
Review of Financial Studies 2 0.75 4*
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 2 0.75 4
Applied Econometrics 2 0.75 3
European Financial Management 2 0.75 3
Finance and Stochastics 2 0.75 3
Journal of Business Ethics 2 0.75 3
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2 0.75 3
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 2 0.75 3
Journal of Empirical Finance 2 0.75 3
Journal of Financial Econometrics 2 0.75 3
Mathematical Finance 2 0.75 3
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 2 0.75 3
Journal of Accounting and Economics 1 0.38 4*
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 0.38 4*
Review of Economic Studies 1 0.38 4*
Business Ethics Quarterly 1 0.38 4
Journal of Economic Perspectives 1 0.38 4
Journal of Economic Theory 1 0.38 4
Financial Analysts Journal 1 0.38 3
Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 1 0.38 3
International Journal of Finance and Economics 1 0.38 3
Journal of Financial Services Research 1 0.38 3
Journal of International Money and Finance 1 0.38 3
Articles in ABS 4*, 4, 3 ranked journals 129 48.68 –
Articles in ABS 2,1 ranked journals and other journals 136 51.32 –
Total articles 265 100
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price discovery, short-term volatility and stock liquidity (Hasbrouck 
and Saar 2013; Malinova et al. 2013; Menkveld 2013; Conrad et al. 
2015). Specifically, researchers found that the introduction of HFT has 
been accompanied by a reduction in trading costs (Angel et al. 2015; 
Jones 2013) and by an improvement in price efficiency (Carrion 2013; 
Brogaard et al. 2014; Chaboud et al. 2014).
Examining the NYSE automated quote dissemination in 2003, the 
seminal paper of Hendershott et al. (2011) measures the causal effect 
of AT on liquidity, and demonstrates that AT activity narrows spreads, 
reduces both adverse selection and trade-related price discovery. Other 
studies highlight how HFT’s market share has boomed over the number 
of years. Examining the role of AT in liquidity supply in 30 DAX stocks 
on the Deutsche Boerse, Hendershott et al. (2011) find that AT repre-
sent 52% of market order volume and 64% of nonmarketable limit order 
volume. Similarly, Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) report that mar-
ket markets constitute the lion share of HFT trading volume (63–72%) 
and limit order traffic 81–86% of NASDAQ-OMS Stockholm Exchange. 
These results demonstrate that AT consume liquidity when it is cheap 
(narrow bid-ask spread or other proxies such as effective spread, per-
centage spread or higher depth) given that it is less likely to submit new 
orders, to cancel their orders and more likely to initiate trades. Similarly, 
Table 4.3 Absolute and percentage frequency of articles by topic and by 
Scopus citations
Topics Frequency % Citations %
Market quality 58 34.5 1098 91.3
Trading strategies and speed 36 21.4 259 21.5
Financial markets structure 14 8.33 134 11.1
Regulation and co-location 11 6.15 74 6.16
Price discovery 10 5.95 113 9.4
Flash crash 5 2.98 42 3.49
Financial disclosure 3 1.79 46 3.83
Transaction costs 3 1.79 26 2.16
Dark market fragmentation 2 1.19 11 0.92
Investors strategies 2 1.19 39 3.24
Order-to-trade 3 1.79 9 0.75
Disposition effect 1 0.6 6 0.5
Hawkes processes 1 0.6 6 0.5
Other 19 11.3 238 19.8
Total 168 100 1202 100
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Yao and Ye (2018) find that HFT liquidity supply is larger for stocks for 
which the spread is constrained to be large because of tick size. Jarnecic 
and Snape (2014) describe the HFT provision of liquidity on an on- 
going basis which robust to fast versus slow and volatile markets resolv-
ing in this way the temporal liquidity imbalances.
Other studies examine HFT consequences around specific events such 
as earnings announcements (EPMs) (Frino et al. 2017), short sale-ban 
(Brogaard et al. 2017), predictable trades (Bessembinder et al. 2016) 
and extreme price movements (EPMs) (Brogaard et al. 2018), generally 
confirming the liquidity improvement.
Using the September 2008 short sale-ban, Brogaard et al. (2017) dis-
entangle the separate impact of short selling by HFTs and non-HFTs. 
They suggest that non-HFTs increase liquidity (as measured by bid-ask 
spreads) while HFTs’ short selling has the opposite effect by adversely 
selecting limit orders which decrease liquidity during extremely volatile 
short-sale ban period. Brogaard et al. (2018) investigate the activity of a 
common endogenous liquidity providers (ELPs), such as HFTs, around 
EPMs discovering that on average HFTs provide liquidity not only dur-
ing normal market conditions but also around a market stress such as 
EPMs.
Other studies have focused on HFT strategies and their influence on 
market quality. For example, Hagstromer and Nordén (2013) examine 
the tick-size changes and find that the activity of market-making HFTs 
mitigates intraday price volatility (or short-term volatility for Boehmer 
et al. 2015), and thus can contain the deterioration of market quality.
4.3.2.2 HFT’s Trading Strategies and Speed
The SEC’s Concept release on Equity Market Structure recognised not 
only that the advent of HFTs is one of the most significant market struc-
ture developments in recent years (SEC 2010) but identified the exist-
ence of four types of short-term HFTs trading strategies—passive market 
making, arbitrage, structural and directional.
“Passive market making” involves the submission of non-marketable 
resting orders that provide liquidity to the marketplace at specified 
prices. Following this strategy, HFT orders are not executed immediately 
but rest on an order book and prices are updated frequently to reflect 
market conditions. In this way HFTs generate a great number of order 
cancellations or modifications as orders are updated and earn a spread 
between bids and offers. This passive strategy decreases effective spread 
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as demonstrated by Menkveld (2013). Similarly, the “arbitrage strat-
egy” does not depend on directional price movements but on price con-
vergence seeking to keep the differences between related products or 
markets.
If HFTs follow “structural strategies”, they attempt to find the weak-
ness in the market structure to take advantage of the other participants. 
In fact, given HFT can access market data in real time, the lower latency 
allows them to establish prices both on the seller and buyer side. In 
contrast, “directional strategies” involve establishing a short position in 
anticipation of a price move up or down. The Concept Release (SEC 
2010) requested comment on two types of directional strategies, order 
anticipation and momentum ignition, that “may pose particular prob-
lems for long-term investors” and “may present serious problems in 
today’s market structure”.
Regarding HFT speed, Menkveld (2016) estimates that algorithms 
have a response time in the order of microseconds (one microsecond is 
10−6). Therefore, even if HFT effects on the market are known, both 
in terms of less adverse-selection cost, tighter bid-ask spread (higher 
liquidity), frequent quote updates between trades and higher price dis-
covery between the quoted updates, and a higher trade probability 
(Brogaard et al. 2018), the main concerns of regulators remain whether 
their speed represents a barrier that limits retail investor trading activ-
ity. Moreover, regarding the open question regarding whether HFTs are 
better informed agents, few studies (Goettler et al. 2009; Aït-Sahalia and 
Saglam 2013) find a liquidity improvement when market makers become 
more informed about fundamental value. Agents arrive randomly and, 
conditional on the state of the limit-order book, they can choose to 
send either a limit or a market order. Other studies discussed HFT speed 
to cancel their outstanding limit order after news (Hoffmann 2014), 
an endogenous strategy that post limit orders at less aggressive prices, 
reducing the trade rate.
Finally, observing the price competition in a limit-order market 
Bongaerts et al. (2016) discover that the increase of HFT has as the final 
effect a general improvement of liquidity.
4.3.2.3 Market Structure, Co-location and Regulation After the Flash Crash
On 6 May 2010, the US financial markets experienced the Flash Crash. 
Nearly one trillion US dollars’ worth of equity vanished in minutes result-
ing from a large automated selling program being rapidly executed in 
the E-mini S&P 500 stock index futures market (Kirilenko et al. 2017). 
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Although HFTs were blamed for this systemic intraday event, an investi-
gation of the FINRA Dataset shows that 6 out of 12 HFTs reduced their 
trading activity in the market “sometime after the crash which caused a 
decline in overall market liquidity. Hence, High-frequency traders did 
accelerate the rate of crash” (Chung et al. 2016, pp. 17–18).
The Flash Crash highlighted for the first time both the changes 
in trading speed and in the market’s structure, a new arena where the 
low-frequency traders (LFTs) can only fail to defend themselves from 
predatory HFTs strategies (Goldstein et al. 2014). It remains still unclear 
if it is the presence of a weak financial market structure that generates 
negative events (like the Flash Crash) or whether the latter can be caused 
by HFT activity. In this respect, Conrad et al. (2015, p. 290) discuss 
“[…] while dislocations are harmful to market integrity, it is important 
to recognize that some discontinuities have always occurred in markets 
(even before the age of electronic trading), just as flickering quotes have 
existed well before the advent of high-frequency quotation…if liquid-
ity provision is not mandated by law, liquidity providers can always exit 
without notice, exposing marketable orders to price risk”.
Some Scholars argue that exchanges have modified their market struc-
ture (Menkveld and Yueshen 2017) to attract more high-frequency trad-
ers by, among other things, permitting “algorithmic traders to co-locate 
their servers in the market’s data centre” (Hendershott et al. 2011). This 
co-location reduces latency and permits HFT to more quickly adjust their 
quotes as market conditions change and to decrease bid-ask spreads and 
increase market depth in the period following the introduction of these 
new facilities (Frino et al. 2014). Using colocation services as a proxy for 
AT and HFT, Aitken et al. (2014) examine the impact of changes in AT 
and HFT on trade size across 24 stock exchanges around the world. Mixed 
results on AT and HFT effects on the average trade size (used to identify 
AT and HFT start dates) were found. The study also demonstrated, for the 
first time, that even if the introduction of co-location facilities leads to the 
presence of HFT, the “colocation dates” do not properly measure effective 
AT and HFT (Aitken et al. 2014) that may enter into the market a few 
months before or after the co-location launch (Frino et al. 2017).
While on one hand the main stock exchanges seek to attract a larger 
number of HFT, both reducing the low latency and introducing new 
trading platforms, on the other hand many regulators around the world 
are trying to limit the massive volume of messages (orders), as submis-
sions and cancellations, made by high-frequency traders. More recently, 
many regulators have attempted to discourage the HFT activity by 
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introducing a specific tax to limit high volumes of messages and can-
cellations despite the lack of agreement on the negative effects of this 
legislation on capital market quality. On 1 August 2012, the French 
government introduced a financial transaction tax applicable on can-
celled orders made by high-frequency traders where all orders cancelled 
or modified within half-second time span are taxed. The tax of 0.01% is 
applied on modified or cancelled orders of French HFT when OTR is 
greater than five (Chung et al. 2016), even if in this case it did not have 
any negative on market quality, both in term of trading volume, volatil-
ity, spreads and depth (Colliard and Hoffmann 2017).
Similarly, on 1 March 2013 Italy introduced the iFTT (Italian 
Financial Transaction Tax) imposing tax on (1) the transfers of the own-
ership of shares and other participating financial instruments, (2) transac-
tions in derivative financial instruments and other transferable securities, 
and (3) HFT (MEF 2013). The initiative was launched by the Italian 
Securities and Exchange Commission (CONSOB) which introduced 
the iFTT with the specific goal of containing the rapid placement and 
cancellation of orders. In fact, a recent study suggests that orders’ can-
cellations “can generate a misleading representation of the actual depth  
of the order book, creating favourable conditions for market manip-
ulation” (Friederich and Payne 2015, p. 215). The iTFF was the first 
order-to-trade ratio tax (OTR) to attempt to reduce the perceived 
harmful behaviours of HFT2 but the new regulation resulted in lower 
average Italian OTRs (Caivano et al. 2012) and a negative effect on mar-
ket liquidity (Friederich and Payne 2015).3 Despite these findings, the 
taxation of HFT is set to continue. Norway, Germany and Canada have 
introduced OTR to limit HFT activity (Malinova et al. 2013; Haferkorn 
and Zimmermann 2014).
4.3.3  HFT Reaction to Corporate Disclosure
Recently Allee et al. (2018) demonstrated the effect of the “scriptability” 
of firm disclosures on capital markets. Scriptability represents the relative 
2 The tax became effective in Borsa Italiana on April 2012 and it intended to charge a fee 
to HFT with OTF higher than 100:1, 500:1 or 1000:1 (see Grant and Rachel 2012).
3 Opposite results have been found by Capelle-Blancard (2016).
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ease with “which a computer program or a computer programmer can 
transform the large amounts of unstructured data contained in various 
firm disclosures into usable information (Bloomfield 2002)”. The general 
assumption here is that “more scriptable” filings allow HFT (and other 
sophisticated investors) gain a short-term information advantage to react 
and trade quickly and increase the information asymmetry immediately 
following disclosures; bid-ask spreads increase by 20–25% in the 30–60 
seconds following Form 4 filings (Rogers et al. 2017). Similar results 
have been found by Frino et al. (2017) that demonstrate that spreads 
increase at the time of the event and decrease in the following minutes.
4.4  conclusIon and Future researcH dIrectIons
The advent of HFT and the introduction of co-location services and 
other facilities irredeemably changed market structures around the 
world. Consequently, transaction costs have decreased sharply—by over 
50% for both retail and institutional investors (Menkveld 2016). Several 
studies discuss the consequences of HFT activity on market quality and 
find a rise in both trading volume and in the number of orders (trades), 
as well as large increases in the number of submissions (messages) and 
cancellations. However, the lack of identification codes (in the main 
financial dataset available) does not allow the disentanglement of trading 
activity by different type of investors (institutional vs. retail investors). As 
a result, both the number of orders and the number of submissions or 
cancellations (messages) are commonly used to build proxies that allow 
the detection of HFT activity thereby allowing scholars to detect the 
consequences of HFT activity in the main financial markets.
Studies of the impact of HFT suggest that information asymmetry 
between buyers and sellers is reduced over the time and, even if very 
often HFT are accused of arbitrage, many empirical studies demonstrate 
a general improvement in market liquidity (as measured by reduction of 
spreads or increases in depth) and a general reduction of the intraday 
price volatility. These results ultimately suggest that any regulatory action 
introduced to curtail this activity may have serious negative implications 
for liquidity and market participants (Frino et al. 2017), as demonstrated 
recently both in France and in Italy (Friederich and Payne 2015).
The large volume of papers published on the topic of AT and HFT 
indicate a clear academic interest in the potential contributions and 
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limitations of HFT activity. However, many open questions remain 
unanswered:
• It is not clear if the systemic risk is embedded in electronic trading 
or really caused by HFT.
• The HFT strategies are still partially undiscovered given that the 
majority of studies use proxies to detect their activity rather than 
identifiers. Consequently, the latter information might provide a 
clear evidence of the real impact of the different trading strategies 
on market quality.
• Only a few studies highlight the effects of HFT activity around spe-
cific events like earnings announcements (Frino et al. 2017), news 
(Scholtus et al. 2014) or macro-news announcements (Bernile et al. 
2016) but how do HFTs react around other specific events like 
mergers and acquisitions or social media releases? What is the effect 
of their activity on market quality in such cases?
• How do HFTs react to narrative accounting disclosure? Given that 
the corporate disclosure is moving towards “machine readable” 
reports, how can firms anticipate HFT trading strategies at the time 
of disclosure?
Firms and investors should take into consideration that with the advent 
of HFTs the speed of dissemination of information (earnings, good or 
bad news, buy or sell quotes and trades) has changed, capital markets 
have evolved, and complex algorithms may soon become obsolescent.
In 2009 and 2010, HFT techniques were considered a goldmine for 
sophisticated investors that know how to deploy them against human 
competitors, however ‘dumb’ competitors got wise and began to employ 
similar strategies to defend their wealth stores (Financial Times 2017). 
According to Tabb Group, the US market makers reported $1.1 bil-
lion in revenue in 2016, compared with $7.2 billion in 2009. This phe-
nomenon demonstrates a slowdown in the world of HFT with lower 
profitability. As HFT speed no longer accrues a significant competitive 
advantage, sophisticated investors are now trying to capture a compet-
itive advantage in predicting markets through quantitative models and 
artificial intelligence (AI) throwing up new challenges and opportunities 
for investors, policymakers and scholars alike.
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